gate fixes: opt-in pipe separator (#7331) + IPv6-safe Origin (#6772)

Two Codex adversarial-security-gate findings on the batch:

1. #7331 CORE (backward-compat break): making '|' an unconditional trusted-groups
   separator would re-split an existing deployment whose group NAME legitimately
   contains a literal '|' (e.g. 'unprivileged|admins' read as one group), silently
   changing its profile binding. Pipe splitting is now OPT-IN via
   HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_GROUPS_PIPE_SEPARATOR; comma/newline stay the default.
   Tests: literal-pipe preserved by default, pipe splits only with the flag set.

2. #6772 follow-up (my own hardening introduced it): rebuilding the origin from
   parsed parts dropped the brackets around an IPv6 host, so 'http://[::1]:8787'
   became 'http://::1:8787' and never matched the browser's bracketed
   clientDataJSON.origin -> passkey login over IPv6 would fail. Re-bracket IPv6
   literals. Added rp_context regression tests (Origin-first, port preserved,
   IPv6 bracketed, malformed->Host fallback, userinfo stripped).

api/auth.py

@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@ _TRUSTED_AUTH_HEADER_ENV = 'HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_AUTH_HEADER'
 _TRUSTED_GROUPS_HEADER_ENV = 'HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_GROUPS_HEADER'
 _TRUSTED_GROUP_PROFILE_MAP_ENV = 'HERMES_WEBUI_GROUP_PROFILE_MAP'
 _TRUSTED_AUTH_LOGOUT_URL_ENV = 'HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_AUTH_LOGOUT_URL'
+# Opt-in: also treat '|' as a group separator in the trusted-groups header.
+# Off by default so an existing deployment whose group NAME legitimately
+# contains a literal '|' is never silently re-split into two groups (which
+# could change its profile binding). Set to 1/true/yes/on for identity
+# providers (some Authentik outpost configs) that emit "admins|developpeur".
+_TRUSTED_GROUPS_PIPE_SEPARATOR_ENV = 'HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_GROUPS_PIPE_SEPARATOR'
 _TRUSTED_AUTH_WARNINGS_EMITTED: set[str] = set()
 
 
@@ -722,15 +728,19 @@ def _trusted_groups_header_value(handler) -> list[str]:
     if not raw:
         return []
     values = []
-    # Authentik's outpost typically joins multiple group names with a comma,
+    # Authentik's outpost typically joins multiple group names with a comma or
-    # but this deployment's proxy provider/property mapping emits a
+    # newline; parse those as separators by default. Some proxy provider /
-    # pipe-separated list instead (e.g. "admins|developpeur"). A bare comma
+    # property-mapping configs instead emit a pipe-separated list (e.g.
-    # split silently treats a multi-group pipe-joined value as one unmatched
+    # "admins|developpeur"), which a comma-only split would treat as one
-    # group name, dropping the session to the unbound "default" profile even
+    # unmatched group name — silently dropping the session to the unbound
-    # though the identity is a legitimate member of a mapped group. Accept
+    # "default" profile despite a legitimate mapped membership. Pipe splitting
-    # comma, pipe, and newline as equivalent separators so either format
+    # is therefore available but OPT-IN (HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_GROUPS_PIPE_SEPARATOR),
-    # works regardless of which the outpost happens to send.
+    # because a group NAME can legitimately contain a literal '|' and must not be
-    normalized = str(raw).replace('\n', ',').replace('|', ',')
+    # re-split by default — doing so unconditionally could change an existing
+    # deployment's profile binding.
+    normalized = str(raw).replace('\n', ',')
+    if str(os.getenv(_TRUSTED_GROUPS_PIPE_SEPARATOR_ENV, '')).strip().lower() in ('1', 'true', 'yes', 'on'):
+        normalized = normalized.replace('|', ',')
     for part in normalized.split(','):
         part = part.strip()
         if part:

api/passkeys.py

@@ -208,7 +208,11 @@ def rp_context(handler) -> tuple[str, str]:
             from urllib.parse import urlparse
             parsed = urlparse(browser_origin.strip())
             if parsed.scheme in ("http", "https") and parsed.hostname:
-                netloc = parsed.hostname if parsed.port is None else f"{parsed.hostname}:{parsed.port}"
+                # Re-bracket IPv6 literals: parsed.hostname strips the [] that the
+                # browser's clientDataJSON.origin carries, so an unbracketed
+                # "http://::1:8787" would never match the stored origin.
+                host_part = f"[{parsed.hostname}]" if ":" in parsed.hostname else parsed.hostname
+                netloc = host_part if parsed.port is None else f"{host_part}:{parsed.port}"
                 return parsed.hostname, f"{parsed.scheme}://{netloc}"
         except Exception:
             pass

tests/test_passkey_auth.py

@@ -395,3 +395,73 @@ def test_passwordless_settings_and_last_passkey_guard_are_wired():
     assert "id=\"btnGoPasswordless\"" in index
     assert "async function goPasswordless" in panels
     assert "prompt(" not in panels
+
+
+# ── rp_context: RPID/origin derivation (Origin-first, IPv6-safe) — #6772 ──────
+
+class _HeaderHandler:
+    """Minimal stand-in for the HTTP handler rp_context() reads headers from."""
+
+    def __init__(self, headers):
+        # case-insensitive get, like http.client.HTTPMessage
+        self._h = {k.lower(): v for k, v in headers.items()}
+
+    class _H:
+        def __init__(self, h):
+            self._h = h
+
+        def get(self, name, default=""):
+            return self._h.get(name.lower(), default)
+
+    @property
+    def headers(self):
+        return _HeaderHandler._H(self._h)
+
+
+def test_rp_context_prefers_wellformed_origin_over_host():
+    from api import passkeys
+
+    h = _HeaderHandler({"Origin": "https://app.example.com", "Host": "backend.internal:9000"})
+    rp_id, origin = passkeys.rp_context(h)
+    assert rp_id == "app.example.com"
+    assert origin == "https://app.example.com"
+
+
+def test_rp_context_preserves_origin_port():
+    from api import passkeys
+
+    h = _HeaderHandler({"Origin": "http://localhost:8787", "Host": "localhost:8787"})
+    rp_id, origin = passkeys.rp_context(h)
+    assert rp_id == "localhost"
+    assert origin == "http://localhost:8787"
+
+
+def test_rp_context_ipv6_origin_is_bracketed_to_match_clientdata():
+    """A browser's clientDataJSON.origin brackets an IPv6 host ('http://[::1]:8787').
+    rp_context must store the same bracketed form, or _client_data()'s origin
+    comparison (and thus passkey login over IPv6) would always fail."""
+    from api import passkeys
+
+    h = _HeaderHandler({"Origin": "http://[::1]:8787", "Host": "[::1]:8787"})
+    rp_id, origin = passkeys.rp_context(h)
+    assert rp_id == "::1"
+    assert origin == "http://[::1]:8787"
+
+
+def test_rp_context_falls_back_to_host_on_malformed_origin():
+    from api import passkeys
+
+    for bad in ("javascript:alert(1)", "file:///etc/passwd", "not-a-url", ""):
+        h = _HeaderHandler({"Origin": bad, "Host": "real.example.com"})
+        rp_id, _origin = passkeys.rp_context(h)
+        assert rp_id == "real.example.com", f"expected Host fallback for Origin={bad!r}"
+
+
+def test_rp_context_strips_origin_userinfo():
+    """A userinfo-bearing Origin must not be stored verbatim; the hostname wins."""
+    from api import passkeys
+
+    h = _HeaderHandler({"Origin": "https://user:pw@evil.example.com", "Host": "real.example.com"})
+    rp_id, origin = passkeys.rp_context(h)
+    assert rp_id == "evil.example.com"
+    assert "@" not in origin and origin == "https://evil.example.com"

tests/test_trusted_header_auth.py

@@ -219,18 +219,12 @@ def test_group_map_prefers_mapping_order_over_header_order(monkeypatch):
         ("admins", ["admins"]),
         # Comma-separated (the format this parser originally supported).
         ("admins,developpeur", ["admins", "developpeur"]),
-        # Pipe-separated (this deployment's Authentik outpost format).
-        ("admins|developpeur", ["admins", "developpeur"]),
         # Newline-separated (already supported before this fix).
         ("admins\ndeveloppeur", ["admins", "developpeur"]),
-        # Mixed separators in the same value.
+        # Repeated/adjacent comma separators collapse instead of producing
-        ("admins,developpeur|it\nops", ["admins", "developpeur", "it", "ops"]),
-        # Repeated/adjacent separators collapse instead of producing
         # empty group names.
-        ("admins||developpeur", ["admins", "developpeur"]),
         ("admins,,developpeur", ["admins", "developpeur"]),
         # Surrounding and interior whitespace is trimmed per group.
-        (" admins | developpeur ", ["admins", "developpeur"]),
         ("admins, developpeur", ["admins", "developpeur"]),
     ],
 )
@@ -238,6 +232,45 @@ def test_trusted_groups_header_value_accepts_separator_variants(
     monkeypatch, raw_header, expected
 ):
     _trusted_env(monkeypatch, groups_header="Remote-Groups")
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_GROUPS_PIPE_SEPARATOR", raising=False)
+    handler = _Handler(headers={"Remote-User": "alice", "Remote-Groups": raw_header})
+
+    assert auth._trusted_groups_header_value(handler) == expected
+
+
+def test_trusted_groups_pipe_is_literal_by_default(monkeypatch):
+    """Without the opt-in, a '|' is part of the group NAME, not a separator.
+
+    This is the backward-compatibility guarantee: an existing deployment whose
+    group name legitimately contains a '|' must not be silently re-split into
+    two groups (which could change its profile binding)."""
+    _trusted_env(monkeypatch, groups_header="Remote-Groups")
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_GROUPS_PIPE_SEPARATOR", raising=False)
+    handler = _Handler(
+        headers={"Remote-User": "alice", "Remote-Groups": "admins|developpeur"}
+    )
+
+    assert auth._trusted_groups_header_value(handler) == ["admins|developpeur"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "raw_header, expected",
+    [
+        # Pipe-separated (this deployment's Authentik outpost format).
+        ("admins|developpeur", ["admins", "developpeur"]),
+        # Mixed separators in the same value.
+        ("admins,developpeur|it\nops", ["admins", "developpeur", "it", "ops"]),
+        # Repeated/adjacent pipe separators collapse instead of producing
+        # empty group names.
+        ("admins||developpeur", ["admins", "developpeur"]),
+        # Surrounding and interior whitespace is trimmed per group.
+        (" admins | developpeur ", ["admins", "developpeur"]),
+    ],
+)
+def test_trusted_groups_pipe_separator_opt_in(monkeypatch, raw_header, expected):
+    """With HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_GROUPS_PIPE_SEPARATOR set, '|' also splits."""
+    _trusted_env(monkeypatch, groups_header="Remote-Groups")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_GROUPS_PIPE_SEPARATOR", "1")
     handler = _Handler(headers={"Remote-User": "alice", "Remote-Groups": raw_header})
 
     assert auth._trusted_groups_header_value(handler) == expected
@@ -250,6 +283,7 @@ def test_group_map_accepts_pipe_separated_header_value(monkeypatch):
     # of a mapped group: a lone-membership identity works fine (no
     # separator to parse), but a second group membership starts producing a
     # pipe-joined header value that a comma-only split can't see through.
+    # Pipe splitting is opt-in, so this exercises the env flag explicitly.
     #
     # NOTE: this only covers the concrete-mapped-group case. The
     # wildcard-mapped-group case (a "*" mapping value dominating a concrete
@@ -261,6 +295,7 @@ def test_group_map_accepts_pipe_separated_header_value(monkeypatch):
         groups_header="Remote-Groups",
         group_map={"hermes_devops": "devops"},
     )
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_GROUPS_PIPE_SEPARATOR", "1")
     handler = _Handler(
         headers={"Remote-User": "alice", "Remote-Groups": "hermes_devops|other_group"}
     )