Settings -> Extensions offered an Install button even when extensions were
unconfigured, then dead-ended on 'Extensions not configured' because
install_extension required HERMES_WEBUI_EXTENSION_DIR to be set to an existing
directory. Default to a WebUI-managed root under STATE_DIR/extensions and
bootstrap it on first install so install just works with zero config; the env
var remains an optional override (never auto-created). Gallery-installed
extensions already auto-load via the runtime manifest, so the extension loads
on the next app-shell render with no further setup.
- api/extensions.py: _default_extension_root + _writable_extension_root;
_extension_root/_extension_root_status fall back to the managed default;
install_extension bootstraps via _writable_extension_root; dir-unavailable
warning only fires for an explicitly-set-but-broken env path.
- tests: update disabled-by-default expectations (configured=True, valid=False
pre-install) + new regression proving install bootstraps + auto-loads with
no env.
- docs/EXTENSIONS.md: document zero-config one-click install + env now optional.
- CHANGELOG [Unreleased].
UI enable/disable of installed manifest extensions via a bounded fail-safe
extension-overrides.json state file. Safe boundary: no manifest edits, no asset
fetches, no sidecar proxy, no extension-owned routes. /api/extensions/toggle is
auth+CSRF gated; anchored _EXTENSION_ID_RE (no path traversal); atomic UTF-8 write
under _EXTENSION_STATE_LOCK; 32KiB/512-id DoS bounds; disabled override suppresses
asset/sidecar injection end-to-end. Nathan greenlit the extensions-phase-2 concept.
Code byte-faithful from PR head 8769b4a3902e. 49 own tests pass.
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <agent@nesquena-hermes>
Co-authored-by: santastabber <santastabber@users.noreply.github.com>
* stage #4612 (santastabber): surface loopback sidecar diagnostics + CHANGELOG
Settings -> Extensions surfaces manifest-declared loopback sidecar companion services
(type:loopback, http(s) on 127.0.0.1/localhost/::1 only, sanitized origin+health_path)
as read-only health cards w/ a browser-side credentials-omitted health probe. Backend
hard-whitelists scheme + loopback host, rejects userinfo/path/query/traversal, rebuilds
output from parsed components (no echo of rejected input); frontend esc()'s every field,
whitelists badge status, fetch never reads body. Purely additive to GET /api/extensions/status.
Code applied byte-faithful from PR head 7080929f3727. 33 own tests pass.
Nathan concept-approved (loopback-companion direction).
Co-authored-by: santastabber <santastabber@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix#4612 Codex gate findings: reject encoded query/fragment in health_path + align CSP loopback allowlist
Codex SHIP-WITH-FIXES (2 reproduced SILENT findings):
1. _normalize_sidecar_health_path percent-decoded AFTER the raw query/fragment ban,
so /health%3Ftoken=abc -> ?token=abc survived into the probed URL. Now re-rejects
decoded ? and # + regression test (%3F/%23 skipped with sidecar_health_path_rejected).
2. The origin validator accepts https:// and [::1], but CSP connect-src only listed
http 127.0.0.1/localhost -> accepted https/IPv6 loopback sidecars would be CSP-blocked.
Aligned _CSP_CONNECT_BASE (added https v4/localhost + http(s) [::1]) + updated the 4
exact-string CSP tests + a regression test asserting all loopback forms are allowed.
Co-authored-by: santastabber <santastabber@users.noreply.github.com>
* Release v0.51.564 — Release TW (loopback sidecar diagnostics; #4612)
* fix(#4612): drop browser-invalid [::1]:* CSP source (browser-smoke fail)
The CSP-loopback-alignment fix added http(s)://[::1]:* to connect-src, but CSP
host-source grammar can't express a port wildcard on a bracketed IPv6 literal —
Chromium rejects '[::1]:*' as an invalid source, which browser-smoke flags as a
console error (CI fail). Keep the valid https://127.0.0.1:*/localhost:* additions;
drop the IPv6 wildcard entries. IPv6 [::1] sidecars are still accepted by the
validator (displayed in the card); their browser health probe surfaces as
'blocked' under CSP unless an operator adds a specific-port [::1]:<port> via
HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA. Tests updated to match + assert [::1]:* absent.
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <agent@nesquena-hermes>
Co-authored-by: santastabber <santastabber@users.noreply.github.com>
Codex+Opus ship-gate: a <=64KB but deeply-nested JSON manifest makes json.loads raise
RecursionError, which escaped _read_manifest_urls into the app-shell route -> every page
load 503s. Add RecursionError to the fail-safe except + regression test (verified
red-without/green-with). Co-authored-by: santastabber <santastabber@users.noreply.github.com>
REQUIRED:
- _fully_unquote_path range(3) -> range(10) — defense-in-depth so quadruple-
encoded .. is rejected by validator instead of slipping through (not
exploitable but contract violation)
- docs/EXTENSIONS.md trust-model callout moved to top of file with explicit
'don't enable in untrusted env / don't point at user-writable dir' guidance
NICE-TO-HAVE (taken since Nathan asked for all fixes big and small):
- URL list cap at _MAX_URL_LIST=32 to avoid pathological rendering
- One-shot WARNING log for rejected URLs (silent drop now visible to admin)
- One-shot WARNING log for URL list truncation
- MIME map: ttf (font/ttf), otf (font/otf), wasm (application/wasm)
5 regression tests in tests/test_pr1445_opus_followups.py pin all invariants.
Rod Boev