Files
hermes-webui/tests/test_issue2613_render_cache_signature.py
37c59baf68 fix(ui): prevent OOM on tab focus for long sessions (#7006)
* fix(ui): prevent OOM on tab focus for long sessions

Coordinate visibility-recovery and session-updated refresh paths so they
never start concurrent full-transcript loads, window the O(N) pre-render
scans to the virtual render window, and bound the render-window expansion.

Closes #6999

* fix(ui): full turn context + collision-free cache hash (#7006 review rework)

Addresses the maintainer's CHANGES_REQUESTED on PR #7006:

- Turn-context maps (_assistantTurnFinalVisibleContentMap /
  _assistantTurnVisibleContentMap) receive the FULL visWithIdx again.
  The virtualized render window (head+tail around a gap) cut through
  assistant runs and merged distinct turns across an omitted user
  boundary, which could duplicate the final answer in Worklog/Thinking
  or feed later-turn prose into the reasoning echo-strip. Turn context
  is input, not output: it must always be complete.

- _addBoundedHash now streams the FULL string form through the FNV-1a
  loop (no length+head+tail clip, no slice copies), and object fields
  (attachments, tc.args, compression-anchor keys) are walked key-by-key
  so no integral JSON.stringify() is allocated. Same-length middle-only
  edits of tool args, attachment metadata, tool snippets, or
  compression-anchor keys no longer collide in _sessionHtmlCache.

Regression tests:
- tests/test_issue6999_turn_context_virtual_gap.py: multi-assistant turn
  with a virtualized gap proves full-context echo-strip suppresses the
  exact final-answer echo, and documents the gapped head+tail failure.
- tests/test_issue2613_render_cache_signature.py: Node harness executing
  the real _messageRenderCacheSignature() proves same-length middle-only
  mutations change the signature for every structured field while the
  old clip scheme collides on the same data.

Closes #6999

* fix(ui): coalesce session-updated under refresh guard; insertion-order cache hash

Re-gate round 2 for #6999:
- session-updated frames arriving while the external-refresh guard is held
  are latched per SID (max announced count) and drained by the refresh
  owner's finally with ONE guarded follow-up, instead of being dropped
  (production does not guarantee a second event).
- _hashObjectInto walks keys in insertion order (matching Object.entries
  render projection) with an explicit per-key index discriminator, so
  opposite-insertion-order argument objects no longer share a cache
  signature; recursion depth is now threaded (children increment, not
  restart).

* test(jump-scroll): stub _loadingSessionId + _drainSessionUpdatedPendingCount in extraction harness

#7006 adds a reference to the pre-existing module var _loadingSessionId and a new
_drainSessionUpdatedPendingCount() helper inside refreshActiveSessionIfExternallyUpdated.
The jump-to-answer scroll-settle tests extract that function into a node harness, which
didn't declare them -> ReferenceError (19 parametrized failures). Add the missing stubs
to the harness preambles (no-op drain, since these tests exercise scroll ownership, not
the coalesce path -- real drain behavior is covered by test_issue6999_session_updated_coalesce.py).
Test-harness-only; production static/ untouched.

Co-authored-by: webtecnica <webtecnica@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <agent@nesquena-hermes>
Co-authored-by: webtecnica <webtecnica@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-14 19:42:15 -07:00

298 lines
13 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
UI_JS = Path("static/ui.js").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
NODE = shutil.which("node")
def test_session_html_cache_uses_render_signature_not_only_count():
assert "function _messageRenderCacheSignature()" in UI_JS
assert "const renderSignature=_messageRenderCacheSignature();" in UI_JS
assert "cached.signature===renderSignature" in UI_JS
assert "signature:renderSignature" in UI_JS
def test_render_signature_tracks_message_content_and_settled_tool_cards():
signature_fn = UI_JS[UI_JS.index("function _messageRenderCacheSignature()"):UI_JS.index("function _clipCliToolSnippet")]
assert "msgContent(m)" in signature_fn
assert "m.tool_calls" in signature_fn
assert "m._partial_tool_calls" in signature_fn
assert "S.toolCalls" in signature_fn
assert "tc.snippet" in signature_fn
assert "compression_anchor_summary" in signature_fn
def test_documentation_no_longer_allows_same_count_stale_html():
assert "Known limitation: cache key is session_id + message count" not in UI_JS
assert "mutate message content without changing the count will serve stale HTML" not in UI_JS
# ── #6999: same-length MIDDLE-only mutations must change the signature ──────
# The first #6999 iteration hashed structured fields with length+head+tail
# (_addBoundedHash). Same-length edits in the MIDDLE of tool arguments,
# attachment metadata, tool snippets, or compression-anchor keys produced an
# identical signature, and _sessionHtmlCache treats signature equality as
# authority — a deterministic stale-cache collision on cross-session
# navigation. These tests execute the real _messageRenderCacheSignature()
# (plus its helpers) under Node and prove that a middle-only, same-length
# mutation of every structured field changes the signature, while the old
# clip scheme demonstrably collides on the very same data.
def _function_source(name: str) -> str:
"""Return the full ``function name(...) {...}`` source from static/ui.js."""
marker = f"function {name}"
start = UI_JS.find(marker)
assert start != -1, f"{name} not found in static/ui.js"
params = UI_JS.find("(", start)
assert params != -1, f"{name} has no parameter list"
depth = 0
close = -1
for idx in range(params, len(UI_JS)):
if UI_JS[idx] == "(":
depth += 1
elif UI_JS[idx] == ")":
depth -= 1
if depth == 0:
close = idx
break
assert close != -1, f"{name} parameter list did not close"
brace = UI_JS.find("{", close)
assert brace != -1, f"{name} has no body"
depth = 0
for idx in range(brace, len(UI_JS)):
if UI_JS[idx] == "{":
depth += 1
elif UI_JS[idx] == "}":
depth -= 1
if depth == 0:
return UI_JS[start : idx + 1]
raise AssertionError(f"{name} body did not close")
_FN_DECL_RE = re.compile(r"\bfunction\s+([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\s*\(")
def _collect_functions(names: list[str]) -> str:
"""Concatenate the sources of ``names`` plus every ``function X(`` dep."""
out: dict[str, str] = {}
stack = list(names)
seen: set[str] = set()
while stack:
name = stack.pop()
if name in seen:
continue
seen.add(name)
src = _function_source(name)
out[name] = src
for dep in _FN_DECL_RE.findall(src):
if dep not in seen:
stack.append(dep)
return "\n".join(out.values())
_SIGNATURE_NODE_BODY = r"""
const LONG = 'A'.repeat(5000);
// Same-length middle-only mutation of LONG: byte-for-byte identical head and
// tail, one different character at position 2500.
const MID = LONG.slice(0, 2500) + 'B' + LONG.slice(2501);
// Snippets used a 4096-char clip window: the mutation must sit outside BOTH
// the 4096 head and the 4096 tail, so the field has to exceed 8192 chars.
const LONG2 = 'C'.repeat(20000);
const MID2 = LONG2.slice(0, 10000) + 'D' + LONG2.slice(10001);
function state(mutator) {
const S = {
messages: [
{role: 'user', content: 'u1'},
{role: 'assistant', content: 'a1', tool_calls: [{id: 'tc-m1', type: 'function', function: {name: 'shell', arguments: LONG}}]},
{role: 'assistant', content: 'a2', attachments: [{name: 'report.pdf', data: LONG}]},
{role: 'user', content: 'u2'},
{role: 'assistant', content: 'a3'},
],
toolCalls: [{tid: 'tc1', id: 'tc-m1', name: 'shell', done: true, is_diff: false, assistant_msg_idx: 1, snippet: LONG2, args: {cmd: 'cat', data: LONG}}],
session: {session_id: 'sid', message_count: 5, updated_at: 111, compression_anchor_visible_idx: 0, compression_anchor_message_key: {role: 'assistant', ts: 123, text: LONG, attachments: 1}, compression_anchor_summary: ''},
};
if (mutator) mutator(S);
return S;
}
// The pre-#6999 clip scheme: length + head + tail of the string form.
function oldBoundedHash(value, maxLen) {
const limit = Math.max(64, Number(maxLen) || 512);
let s = '';
try { s = (value == null) ? '' : String(value); } catch (e) { s = ''; }
let h = 2166136261;
const add = (v) => {
const st = String(v == null ? '' : v);
for (let i = 0; i < st.length; i++) { h ^= st.charCodeAt(i); h = Math.imul(h, 16777619) >>> 0; }
h ^= 31; h = Math.imul(h, 16777619) >>> 0;
};
add(s.length);
if (s.length > limit) { add(s.slice(0, limit)); add(s.slice(-limit)); } else { add(s); }
return h;
}
globalThis.S = state(null);
const base = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
const baseAgain = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
// 1) middle-only edit of a message tool-call's function.arguments string.
globalThis.S = state((S) => { S.messages[1].tool_calls[0].function.arguments = MID; });
const sigArgsMut = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
// 2) middle-only edit inside a settled tool call's args object.
globalThis.S = state((S) => { S.toolCalls[0].args.data = MID; });
const sigArgsObjMut = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
// 3) middle-only edit inside an attachment object.
globalThis.S = state((S) => { S.messages[2].attachments[0].data = MID; });
const sigAttachMut = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
// 4) middle-only edit inside the compression-anchor message key.
globalThis.S = state((S) => { S.session.compression_anchor_message_key.text = MID; });
const sigAnchorMut = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
// 5) middle-only edit of a settled tool snippet (20000 chars, 4096 clip window).
globalThis.S = state((S) => { S.toolCalls[0].snippet = MID2; });
const sigSnippetMut = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
console.log(JSON.stringify({
deterministic: base === baseAgain,
differArgs: base !== sigArgsMut,
differArgsObj: base !== sigArgsObjMut,
differAttach: base !== sigAttachMut,
differAnchor: base !== sigAnchorMut,
differSnippet: base !== sigSnippetMut,
oldCollidesArgs: oldBoundedHash(LONG, 2048) === oldBoundedHash(MID, 2048),
oldCollidesArgsObj: oldBoundedHash(JSON.stringify({cmd: 'cat', data: LONG}), 2048) === oldBoundedHash(JSON.stringify({cmd: 'cat', data: MID}), 2048),
oldCollidesAttach: oldBoundedHash(JSON.stringify({name: 'report.pdf', data: LONG}), 2048) === oldBoundedHash(JSON.stringify({name: 'report.pdf', data: MID}), 2048),
oldCollidesAnchor: oldBoundedHash(JSON.stringify({role: 'assistant', ts: 123, text: LONG, attachments: 1}), 1024) === oldBoundedHash(JSON.stringify({role: 'assistant', ts: 123, text: MID, attachments: 1}), 1024),
oldCollidesSnippet: oldBoundedHash(LONG2, 4096) === oldBoundedHash(MID2, 4096),
}));
"""
def _run_signature_node() -> dict:
assert NODE, "node is required for the render-cache signature harness"
script = f"const window = {{}};\n{_collect_functions(['_messageRenderCacheSignature', '_addBoundedHash', '_hashObjectInto', 'msgContent', '_messageHasReasoningPayload'])}\n{_SIGNATURE_NODE_BODY}"
result = subprocess.run([NODE, "-e", script], text=True, capture_output=True, check=False)
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
return json.loads(result.stdout)
def test_middle_only_mutations_change_render_signature():
out = _run_signature_node()
assert out["deterministic"], "identical state must yield an identical signature"
# Every same-length middle-only edit must change the signature — the
# pre-#6999 length+head+tail clip collided on exactly these edits.
assert out["differArgs"], "middle edit of tool function.arguments must change the signature"
assert out["differArgsObj"], "middle edit inside tc.args must change the signature"
assert out["differAttach"], "middle edit inside an attachment must change the signature"
assert out["differAnchor"], "middle edit inside the compression-anchor key must change the signature"
assert out["differSnippet"], "middle edit of a tool snippet must change the signature"
def test_old_clip_scheme_collides_on_the_same_middle_edits():
"""Document the exact bug class: the old clip scheme collides here."""
out = _run_signature_node()
assert out["oldCollidesArgs"]
assert out["oldCollidesArgsObj"]
assert out["oldCollidesAttach"]
assert out["oldCollidesAnchor"]
assert out["oldCollidesSnippet"]
# ── #6999 re-gate: insertion order + recursion depth ────────────────────────
# _hashObjectInto() used to Object.keys(value).sort() while BOTH tool-detail
# render paths (buildToolCard and _transparentToolDetailHtml) render
# Object.entries(tc.args) — insertion order. Two argument objects with
# opposite insertion order therefore rendered DIFFERENT HTML while receiving
# the SAME cache signature (sandbox repro: alpha=A|beta=B vs beta=B|alpha=A
# with sameSignature=true). The fix walks keys in insertion order with an
# explicit per-key index discriminator, and threads recursion depth (child
# calls used to restart depth at 0, so the depth>64 guard never fired for
# nested/cyclic payloads).
def test_hash_object_preserves_insertion_order_not_sorted():
fn = _function_source("_hashObjectInto")
assert "Object.keys(value).sort()" not in fn, (
"sorting keys aliases opposite-insertion-order args onto one signature"
)
assert "const keys=Object.keys(value);" in fn
assert "add(i)" in fn, "the per-key index must discriminate insertion order"
def test_hash_add_bounded_threads_recursion_depth():
fn = _function_source("_addBoundedHash")
assert "function _addBoundedHash(add, value, depth)" in fn
assert "_hashObjectInto(add, value, (depth||0)+1)" in fn, (
"child objects must increment depth, not restart at 0"
)
_INSERTION_ORDER_NODE_BODY = r"""
function stateWithArgs(args) {
return {
messages: [
{role: 'user', content: 'u1'},
{role: 'assistant', content: 'a1'},
],
toolCalls: [{tid: 'tc1', id: 'tc-m1', name: 'shell', done: true, is_diff: false, assistant_msg_idx: 1, snippet: 'out', args}],
session: {session_id: 'sid', message_count: 2, updated_at: 111, compression_anchor_visible_idx: 0, compression_anchor_message_key: null, compression_anchor_summary: ''},
};
}
globalThis.S = stateWithArgs({alpha: 'A', beta: 'B'});
const sigAlphaBeta = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
globalThis.S = stateWithArgs({beta: 'B', alpha: 'A'});
const sigBetaAlpha = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
globalThis.S = stateWithArgs({alpha: 'A', beta: 'B'});
const sigAlphaBetaAgain = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
// Deeply nested payload: 100 levels of objects (far past the depth>64 guard).
let deep = {leaf: 'x'};
for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) deep = {child: deep};
globalThis.S = stateWithArgs(deep);
const sigDeep = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
globalThis.S = stateWithArgs(deep);
const sigDeepAgain = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
// Cyclic payload: JSON.stringify would reject it; the depth guard must
// serialize it via the [unserializable] path instead of recursing forever.
const cyc = {}; cyc.self = cyc;
globalThis.S = stateWithArgs(cyc);
const sigCyclic = _messageRenderCacheSignature();
console.log(JSON.stringify({
differInsertionOrder: sigAlphaBeta !== sigBetaAlpha,
sameOrderDeterministic: sigAlphaBeta === sigAlphaBetaAgain,
deepDeterministic: sigDeep === sigDeepAgain,
cyclicComputes: typeof sigCyclic === 'string' && sigCyclic.length > 0,
}));
"""
def _run_insertion_order_node() -> dict:
assert NODE, "node is required for the render-cache signature harness"
script = (
f"const window = {{}};\n"
f"{_collect_functions(['_messageRenderCacheSignature', '_addBoundedHash', '_hashObjectInto', 'msgContent', '_messageHasReasoningPayload'])}\n"
f"{_INSERTION_ORDER_NODE_BODY}"
)
result = subprocess.run([NODE, "-e", script], text=True, capture_output=True, check=False)
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
return json.loads(result.stdout)
def test_opposite_insertion_order_arguments_get_different_signatures():
"""alpha=A|beta=B and beta=B|alpha=A must NOT share a cache signature."""
out = _run_insertion_order_node()
assert out["differInsertionOrder"], (
"opposite insertion order renders different HTML but the signature aliased it"
)
assert out["sameOrderDeterministic"], "identical order must stay deterministic"
def test_depth_guard_survives_deep_and_cyclic_payloads():
"""Recursion depth must increment (not restart), so the depth>64 guard
actually fires for nested/cyclic tool args instead of overflowing."""
out = _run_insertion_order_node()
assert out["deepDeterministic"], "100-level-deep args must hash deterministically"
assert out["cyclicComputes"], "cyclic args must fall back to [unserializable], not hang"