* fix(security): trusted-proxy-verified local-origin gate (maintainer fix of #5764) Rebuild _onboarding_request_is_local with a single, symmetric trust model that closes the embedded-terminal local-gate bypass AND fixes the direct-LAN lockout regression from the contributor's #5764 attempt (bounced with these findings): 1. SPOOF CLOSED: a forwarded client IP is honored ONLY when the un-spoofable raw socket peer is a trusted proxy (loopback, or HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS). A public direct client sending X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 is judged on its raw public peer -> DENY. New _raw_peer_is_trusted_proxy + _forwarded_client_ip_from _trusted_proxy consume the FULL XFF chain (get_all, repeated headers), walk it right-to-left skipping trusted hops, and fail closed on empty/blank/garbage. 2. NO LAN LOCKOUT: a direct loopback/LAN client with no proxy header stays local (onboarding, first-password/passkey, passwordless terminal keep working). 3. COMPAT: TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR=1 stays the opt-in that consults the chain; the new TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS only WIDENS trust to a non-loopback proxy (loopback always trusted). Shipped private-peer-with-forwarded-header deny nuance preserved. Updated the one existing test that encoded the vulnerable behavior; added a 21-case adversarial truth-table regression (tests/test_cvd3_terminal_local_origin_gate.py). 66 gate tests + 720 auth/terminal regression pass. Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): family-aware trusted-proxy membership (IPv4-mapped-IPv6) Codex re-gate CORE: a mapped-IPv6 address (::ffff:10.9.9.9) never matched an IPv4 CIDR allowlist via 'addr in net' -> (1) legit proxy treated as untrusted = lockout; (2) mapped trusted HOP in the XFF chain mis-returned as client -> a preceding public client admitted to the terminal gate. New _ip_in_networks helper checks addr AND addr.ipv4_mapped; both the peer check and the chain-walk _is_trusted_hop route through it. +3 mapped-IPv6 regression cases (incl the public-client-hidden-behind-mapped-trusted-hop security case). --------- Co-authored-by: t <a@b> Co-authored-by: Hinotoi-agent <Hinotoi-agent@users.noreply.github.com>
372 lines
15 KiB
Python
372 lines
15 KiB
Python
import io
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from types import SimpleNamespace
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from urllib.parse import urlsplit
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from pathlib import Path
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class _Headers(dict):
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def get(self, key, default=None):
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for k, v in self.items():
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if k.lower() == key.lower():
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return v
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return default
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class _Handler:
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def __init__(self, *, client_ip="8.8.8.8", headers=None, body=b"{}"):
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self.client_address = (client_ip, 12345)
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self.headers = _Headers(headers or {})
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self.rfile = io.BytesIO(body)
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self.wfile = io.BytesIO()
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self.request = None
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self.status = None
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self.sent_headers = []
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def send_response(self, code):
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self.status = code
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def send_header(self, key, value):
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self.sent_headers.append((key, value))
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def end_headers(self):
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pass
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def test_onboarding_local_gate_ignores_forwarded_ip_unless_trusted(monkeypatch):
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from api import routes
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR", raising=False)
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handler = _Handler(
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client_ip="8.8.8.8",
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headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "127.0.0.1", "X-Real-IP": "10.0.0.2"},
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)
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assert routes._onboarding_request_is_local(handler) is False
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def test_onboarding_local_gate_uses_forwarded_ip_when_explicitly_trusted(monkeypatch):
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"""Even with HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR=1, a forwarded header is only
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honored when the RAW socket peer is a trusted proxy (loopback or in
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HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS). A PUBLIC direct client (raw peer 8.8.8.8)
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that merely SETS X-Forwarded-For can NOT promote itself to local — otherwise
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a passwordless WebUI with the opt-in enabled would admit any remote attacker
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to the embedded terminal (#5764). The forwarded IP is consulted only after
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the un-spoofable socket peer is confirmed to be a trusted proxy.
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"""
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from api import routes
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR", "1")
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS", raising=False)
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handler = _Handler(
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client_ip="8.8.8.8",
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headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "10.0.0.2", "X-Real-IP": "203.0.113.11"},
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)
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# Raw peer 8.8.8.8 is NOT a trusted proxy → forwarded header ignored →
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# classified by the public raw peer → DENY.
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assert routes._onboarding_request_is_local(handler) is False
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# With the peer's own network in the trusted-proxy allowlist, the forwarded
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# client IP (private 10.0.0.2) is now honored → local.
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS", "8.8.8.0/24")
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assert routes._onboarding_request_is_local(handler) is True
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def test_onboarding_trusted_forwarded_for_uses_proxy_appended_rightmost_ip(monkeypatch):
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from api import routes
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR", "1")
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handler = _Handler(
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client_ip="10.0.0.10",
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headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "127.0.0.1, 8.8.8.8"},
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)
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assert routes._onboarding_request_is_local(handler) is False
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def test_docker_env_log_obfuscates_password_and_secret_names():
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src = Path("docker_init.bash").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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line = next(l for l in src.splitlines() if l.startswith("export ENV_OBFUSCATE_PART="))
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assert "PASSWORD" in line
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assert "SECRET" in line
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assert "TOKEN" in line
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assert "API" in line
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assert "KEY" in line
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def test_get_update_check_returns_cache_without_fetch(monkeypatch):
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from api import routes, updates
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "load_settings", lambda: {"check_for_updates": True})
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monkeypatch.setattr(updates, "cached_update_status", lambda include_agent=True: {"checked_at": 123, "webui": None, "agent": None, "include_agent": include_agent})
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monkeypatch.setattr(updates, "check_for_updates", lambda *a, **k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(AssertionError("GET must not fetch")))
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handler = _Handler(client_ip="127.0.0.1")
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routes.handle_get(handler, urlsplit("/api/updates/check?force=1"))
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assert handler.status == 200
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def test_cached_update_status_does_not_drop_agent_info_when_reenabled(monkeypatch):
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from api import updates
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cached_agent = {"name": "agent", "behind": 2}
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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updates,
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"_update_cache",
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{
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"webui": {"name": "webui", "behind": 0},
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"agent": cached_agent,
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"checked_at": 123,
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"include_agent": False,
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},
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)
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result = updates.cached_update_status(include_agent=True)
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assert result["agent"] == cached_agent
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def test_post_update_check_performs_forced_fetch(monkeypatch):
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from api import routes
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calls = []
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "load_settings", lambda: {"check_for_updates": True})
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "_check_csrf", lambda handler: True)
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def fake_check(*, force=False, include_agent=True, channel="stable"):
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calls.append((force, include_agent))
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return {"checked_at": 456, "webui": None, "agent": None}
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.updates.check_for_updates", fake_check)
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body = b'{"force": true}'
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handler = _Handler(client_ip="127.0.0.1", body=body, headers={"Content-Length": str(len(body))})
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routes.handle_post(handler, SimpleNamespace(path="/api/updates/check", query=""))
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assert handler.status == 200
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assert calls == [(True, True)]
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def test_onboarding_untrusted_forwarded_header_denies_lan_proxy_socket(monkeypatch):
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"""Reverse-proxy regression (release-gate CORE fix): when forwarded headers
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are present but HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR is NOT set, the spoofable
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header is ignored and locality is judged by the raw socket — but a PRIVATE/LAN
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raw socket (a separate proxy box that could be forwarding an arbitrary public
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client) is NOT treated as local. A loopback raw socket is still genuine
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same-host and remains allowed (a remote attacker cannot forge a 127.0.0.1 TCP
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source). Operators with a LAN proxy must set HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR=1.
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"""
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from api import routes
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR", raising=False)
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# LAN proxy box (private raw socket) forwarding a public client → DENY
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handler = _Handler(client_ip="10.0.0.5", headers={"X-Real-IP": "203.0.113.7"})
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assert routes._onboarding_request_is_local(handler) is False
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handler2 = _Handler(client_ip="172.20.0.1", headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "8.8.8.8"})
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assert routes._onboarding_request_is_local(handler2) is False
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# Genuine same-host: loopback raw socket is local even if a forwarded header
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# is present (the TCP source genuinely came from localhost; unspoofable).
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handler3 = _Handler(client_ip="127.0.0.1", headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "8.8.8.8"})
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assert routes._onboarding_request_is_local(handler3) is True
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def test_onboarding_spoofed_forwarded_header_from_public_socket_denied(monkeypatch):
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"""The original spoof hole: a public client setting X-Forwarded-For=127.0.0.1
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must NOT bypass the gate. The forwarded header is ignored; the public raw
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socket governs → denied.
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"""
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from api import routes
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR", raising=False)
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handler = _Handler(client_ip="8.8.8.8", headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "127.0.0.1"})
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assert routes._onboarding_request_is_local(handler) is False
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def test_onboarding_direct_loopback_without_forwarded_headers_is_local(monkeypatch):
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"""A genuine direct local client (no proxy headers) is still allowed."""
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from api import routes
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR", raising=False)
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handler = _Handler(client_ip="127.0.0.1", headers={})
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assert routes._onboarding_request_is_local(handler) is True
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handler_public = _Handler(client_ip="8.8.8.8", headers={})
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assert routes._onboarding_request_is_local(handler_public) is False
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def test_onboarding_complete_is_gated_against_public_clients(monkeypatch):
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"""POST /api/onboarding/complete flips the first-run wizard off
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(onboarding_completed=True). On a passwordless bind it must be gated on the
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same local-network check as setup/oauth/probe, so an unauthenticated public
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client can't hide the wizard. (#3765 — sibling-path gap left by #3758.)
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"""
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from api import routes
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "_check_csrf", lambda handler: True)
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_WEBUI_ONBOARDING_OPEN", "")
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.is_auth_enabled", lambda: False)
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called = {"n": 0}
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def fake_complete():
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called["n"] += 1
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return {"completed": True}
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "complete_onboarding", fake_complete)
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# Public client (no forwarded headers) → 403, complete_onboarding NOT called
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pub = _Handler(client_ip="8.8.8.8", body=b"{}", headers={"Content-Length": "2"})
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routes.handle_post(pub, SimpleNamespace(path="/api/onboarding/complete", query=""))
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assert pub.status == 403
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assert called["n"] == 0
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# Genuine loopback client → allowed
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loop = _Handler(client_ip="127.0.0.1", body=b"{}", headers={"Content-Length": "2"})
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routes.handle_post(loop, SimpleNamespace(path="/api/onboarding/complete", query=""))
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assert loop.status == 200
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assert called["n"] == 1
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def test_onboarding_complete_allowed_when_auth_enabled(monkeypatch):
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"""With auth configured, onboarding endpoints are reachable normally."""
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from api import routes
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "_check_csrf", lambda handler: True)
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.is_auth_enabled", lambda: True)
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "complete_onboarding", lambda: {"completed": True})
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h = _Handler(client_ip="8.8.8.8", body=b"{}", headers={"Content-Length": "2"})
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routes.handle_post(h, SimpleNamespace(path="/api/onboarding/complete", query=""))
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assert h.status == 200
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def test_first_password_setup_is_gated_against_public_clients(monkeypatch):
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"""Unauthenticated first-password setup is bootstrap-sensitive.
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While auth is disabled, POST /api/settings normally passes the auth/CSRF
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checks. A public client must not be able to win first-run ownership by
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setting `_set_password`; it should be gated like onboarding setup and should
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not write settings.
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"""
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from api import routes
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "_check_csrf", lambda handler: True)
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.is_auth_enabled", lambda: False)
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.parse_cookie", lambda handler: "")
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.verify_session", lambda cookie: False)
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_ONBOARDING_OPEN", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR", raising=False)
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saved = {"called": False}
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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routes,
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"save_settings",
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lambda body: saved.__setitem__("called", True) or dict(body),
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)
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body = b'{"_set_password":"attacker-password"}'
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handler = _Handler(
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client_ip="8.8.8.8",
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body=body,
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headers={"Content-Length": str(len(body))},
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)
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routes.handle_post(handler, SimpleNamespace(path="/api/settings", query=""))
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assert handler.status == 403
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assert saved["called"] is False
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def test_first_password_setup_allows_genuine_loopback_client(monkeypatch):
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"""A same-host first-run setup flow still works without setting the bypass env."""
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from api import routes
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auth_state = {"enabled": False}
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "_check_csrf", lambda handler: True)
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.is_auth_enabled", lambda: auth_state["enabled"])
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.parse_cookie", lambda handler: "")
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.verify_session", lambda cookie: False)
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.create_session", lambda: "new-session")
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_ONBOARDING_OPEN", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR", raising=False)
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def fake_save_settings(body):
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auth_state["enabled"] = True
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return {"theme": "dark", "password_hash": "redacted"}
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "save_settings", fake_save_settings)
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body = b'{"_set_password":"local-owner-password"}'
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handler = _Handler(
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client_ip="127.0.0.1",
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body=body,
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headers={"Content-Length": str(len(body))},
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)
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routes.handle_post(handler, SimpleNamespace(path="/api/settings", query=""))
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assert handler.status == 200
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assert any(key.lower() == "set-cookie" for key, _ in handler.sent_headers)
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def test_first_password_setup_uses_initial_auth_state_for_gate(monkeypatch):
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"""A public bootstrap request cannot pass just because auth flips mid-request."""
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from api import routes
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auth_checks = iter([False, True])
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "_check_csrf", lambda handler: True)
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.is_auth_enabled", lambda: next(auth_checks))
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.parse_cookie", lambda handler: "")
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.verify_session", lambda cookie: False)
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_ONBOARDING_OPEN", raising=False)
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saved = {"called": False}
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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routes,
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"save_settings",
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lambda body: saved.__setitem__("called", True) or dict(body),
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)
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body = b'{"_set_password":"attacker-password"}'
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handler = _Handler(
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client_ip="8.8.8.8",
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body=body,
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headers={"Content-Length": str(len(body))},
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)
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routes.handle_post(handler, SimpleNamespace(path="/api/settings", query=""))
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assert handler.status == 403
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assert saved["called"] is False
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def test_first_password_setup_allows_public_client_with_open_onboarding(monkeypatch):
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"""The documented operator opt-in permits remote first-run bootstrap."""
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from api import routes
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auth_state = {"enabled": False}
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "_check_csrf", lambda handler: True)
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.is_auth_enabled", lambda: auth_state["enabled"])
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.parse_cookie", lambda handler: "")
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.verify_session", lambda cookie: False)
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monkeypatch.setattr("api.auth.create_session", lambda: "new-session")
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_WEBUI_ONBOARDING_OPEN", "1")
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def fake_save_settings(body):
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auth_state["enabled"] = True
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return {"theme": "dark", "password_hash": "redacted"}
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monkeypatch.setattr(routes, "save_settings", fake_save_settings)
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body = b'{"_set_password":"remote-owner-password"}'
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handler = _Handler(
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client_ip="8.8.8.8",
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body=body,
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headers={"Content-Length": str(len(body))},
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)
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routes.handle_post(handler, SimpleNamespace(path="/api/settings", query=""))
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assert handler.status == 200
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assert any(key.lower() == "set-cookie" for key, _ in handler.sent_headers)
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