0fd9bf3c37
* stage #4612 (santastabber): surface loopback sidecar diagnostics + CHANGELOG Settings -> Extensions surfaces manifest-declared loopback sidecar companion services (type:loopback, http(s) on 127.0.0.1/localhost/::1 only, sanitized origin+health_path) as read-only health cards w/ a browser-side credentials-omitted health probe. Backend hard-whitelists scheme + loopback host, rejects userinfo/path/query/traversal, rebuilds output from parsed components (no echo of rejected input); frontend esc()'s every field, whitelists badge status, fetch never reads body. Purely additive to GET /api/extensions/status. Code applied byte-faithful from PR head 7080929f3727. 33 own tests pass. Nathan concept-approved (loopback-companion direction). Co-authored-by: santastabber <santastabber@users.noreply.github.com> * fix #4612 Codex gate findings: reject encoded query/fragment in health_path + align CSP loopback allowlist Codex SHIP-WITH-FIXES (2 reproduced SILENT findings): 1. _normalize_sidecar_health_path percent-decoded AFTER the raw query/fragment ban, so /health%3Ftoken=abc -> ?token=abc survived into the probed URL. Now re-rejects decoded ? and # + regression test (%3F/%23 skipped with sidecar_health_path_rejected). 2. The origin validator accepts https:// and [::1], but CSP connect-src only listed http 127.0.0.1/localhost -> accepted https/IPv6 loopback sidecars would be CSP-blocked. Aligned _CSP_CONNECT_BASE (added https v4/localhost + http(s) [::1]) + updated the 4 exact-string CSP tests + a regression test asserting all loopback forms are allowed. Co-authored-by: santastabber <santastabber@users.noreply.github.com> * Release v0.51.564 — Release TW (loopback sidecar diagnostics; #4612) * fix(#4612): drop browser-invalid [::1]:* CSP source (browser-smoke fail) The CSP-loopback-alignment fix added http(s)://[::1]:* to connect-src, but CSP host-source grammar can't express a port wildcard on a bracketed IPv6 literal — Chromium rejects '[::1]:*' as an invalid source, which browser-smoke flags as a console error (CI fail). Keep the valid https://127.0.0.1:*/localhost:* additions; drop the IPv6 wildcard entries. IPv6 [::1] sidecars are still accepted by the validator (displayed in the card); their browser health probe surfaces as 'blocked' under CSP unless an operator adds a specific-port [::1]:<port> via HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA. Tests updated to match + assert [::1]:* absent. --------- Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <agent@nesquena-hermes> Co-authored-by: santastabber <santastabber@users.noreply.github.com>
126 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
126 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
"""Regression coverage for configurable CSP connect-src extras (#2901)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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def test_csp_connect_src_default_header_unchanged(monkeypatch):
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from server import Handler
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA", raising=False)
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policy = Handler.csp_report_only_policy()
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expected = (
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"connect-src 'self' http://127.0.0.1:* http://localhost:* "
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"http://ipc.localhost "
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"https://127.0.0.1:* https://localhost:* "
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"ws://127.0.0.1:* ws://localhost:* "
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"https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; "
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)
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assert expected in policy
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def test_csp_connect_src_includes_valid_extra_origins(monkeypatch):
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from server import Handler
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monkeypatch.setenv(
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"HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA",
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"https://metrics.example.com wss://events.example.com:443",
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)
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policy = Handler.csp_report_only_policy()
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assert (
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"connect-src 'self' http://127.0.0.1:* http://localhost:* "
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"http://ipc.localhost "
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"https://127.0.0.1:* https://localhost:* "
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"ws://127.0.0.1:* ws://localhost:* "
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"https://cdn.jsdelivr.net "
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"https://metrics.example.com wss://events.example.com:443; "
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) in policy
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def test_csp_connect_src_allows_https_loopback_for_sidecars(monkeypatch):
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"""#4612 (Codex gate): the sidecar origin validator accepts https:// in
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addition to http on 127.0.0.1/localhost, but the default CSP connect-src only
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listed the http forms — so an accepted https loopback sidecar probe would be
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blocked by CSP. The base policy must allow the https loopback forms.
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(Note: IPv6 [::1] sidecars are accepted by the validator for display, but CSP
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host-source grammar can't express a port wildcard on a bracketed IPv6 literal
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— `[::1]:*` is rejected by the browser — so the IPv6 health probe is expected
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to surface as 'blocked'. An operator who needs it can add a specific-port
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`http://[::1]:<port>` entry via HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA.)"""
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from server import Handler
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA", raising=False)
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policy = Handler.csp_report_only_policy()
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for origin in (
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"https://127.0.0.1:*",
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"https://localhost:*",
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):
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assert origin in policy, f"CSP connect-src must allow {origin} for sidecar health probes"
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# The invalid IPv6 port-wildcard form must NOT be present (browser rejects it).
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assert "[::1]:*" not in policy, "CSP must not contain the browser-invalid [::1]:* source"
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def test_csp_connect_src_includes_explicit_trusted_sidecar_origin(monkeypatch):
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from server import Handler
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monkeypatch.setenv(
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"HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA",
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"http://127.0.0.1:17787 ws://127.0.0.1:17787",
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)
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report_only = Handler.csp_report_only_policy()
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assert "http://127.0.0.1:17787" in report_only
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assert "ws://127.0.0.1:17787" in report_only
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from api.helpers import _build_csp_enforced_policy
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enforced = _build_csp_enforced_policy()
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assert "http://127.0.0.1:17787" in enforced
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assert "ws://127.0.0.1:17787" in enforced
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def test_csp_connect_src_rejects_directive_injection(monkeypatch, caplog):
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from server import Handler
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monkeypatch.setenv(
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"HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA",
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"https://metrics.example.com; script-src *",
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)
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policy = Handler.csp_report_only_policy()
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assert "https://metrics.example.com" not in policy
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assert "script-src *" not in policy
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assert "Ignoring invalid HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA" in caplog.text
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def test_csp_connect_src_rejects_paths(monkeypatch):
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from server import Handler
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monkeypatch.setenv(
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"HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA",
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"https://metrics.example.com/api",
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)
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policy = Handler.csp_report_only_policy()
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assert "https://metrics.example.com/api" not in policy
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def test_csp_connect_src_rejects_invalid_ports(monkeypatch):
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from server import Handler
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monkeypatch.setenv(
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"HERMES_WEBUI_CSP_CONNECT_EXTRA",
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"https://metrics.example.com:99999",
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)
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policy = Handler.csp_report_only_policy()
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assert "https://metrics.example.com:99999" not in policy
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